This paper studies the effects of international financial liberalization on productivity and investments. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 93 countries (at its largest) observed between 1975 and 1999 that financial liberalization spurs productivity growth and does not robustly affect capital accumulation. In the analysis, I control for the occurrence of banking crises, which turn out to depress both investments and TFP, though they need not be triggered by international financial liberalization. The effects of international financial liberalization and banking crises are persistent and do not vary significantly with the initial level of productivity or capital. These results are robust to a number of econometric specifications. I also provide a theoretical explanation for these results, based on specialization in financial services, which is supported by empirical evidence.
Introduction
Academic economists and practitioners have long debated over the effects of financial globalization on growth. 1 The removal of restrictions on international capital transactions has on some occasions been welcome as a growth opportunity and in others blamed for triggering financial instability and banking crises. Yet, this debate has not addressed the impact of financial liberalization on the sources of growth. 2 Does it affect investments in physical capital or total factor productivity (TFP), or both? If so, in which ways? This paper is a first attempt at answering these questions. By doing that, it contributes to test different models on the effects of financial globalization on macroeconomic performance, and helps understand whether these effects are short-lived or hold in the long run.
A wide literature has investigated the effects of international financial liberalization on GDP growth. The theoretical predictions are ambiguous. Some works suggest that, by promoting cross-country risk-diversification, financial liberalization fosters growth through increased savings and investments (see, for instance, Obstfeld, 1994) . On the other hand, financial liberalization may be harmful for growth in the presence of distortions. It may trigger financial instability, as well as misallocation of capital (e.g. Rodrick, 1998 and Stiglitz, 2000), which are detrimental for macroeconomic performance. The empirical literature has not been able to resolve this theoretical controversy (see Prasad et al., 2003) .
Some studies (for instance, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995 , Kraay, 2000 and Rodrick, 1998 found that financial liberalization does not affect growth, others that the effect is positive (Levine, 2001 , Bekaert et al., 2003 and Bonfiglioli and Mendicino, 2004 ), yet others that it is negative (Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003) . Many authors show the effects to be heterogeneous across countries at different stages of institutional and economic development (see Bekaert et al, 2003 , Chinn and Ito, 2003 and Edwards, 2001 ) and countries with different macroeconomic frameworks (Arteta Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2001 ). Perhaps surprisingly, very little evidence exists on the effects of financial globalization on the main sources of growth: productivity and capital accumulation. 3 In this paper, I separately address the effects of international financial liberalization on capital accumulation and TFP. Financial integration may affect investments and productivity both directly and indirectly. As a direct effect, it may be expected to generate 1 Here financial globalization is meant to be the absence of restrictions to international financial transactions. Henceforth, I will equivalently refer to it as (international) financial liberalization, financial integration, or financial openness. 2 The only evidence in this direction is provided by Levine and Zervos (1998) , who estimate the relation between the sources of growth and measures of stock market integration based on asset pricing models. 3 Chari and Henry (2002) and Henry (2000) provide empirical evidence on the effects of equity market liberalization on investments and Tobin's Q, but do not address productivity.
international competition for funds, thereby driving capital towards the most productive projects. The consequences are ambiguous for both capital accumulation and TFP, since capital reallocations may translate into net inflows for some countries and outflows for others, which may imply that even the relatively more productive projects be shut down in some countries and the relatively less productive be financed in others. 4 Moreover, to the extent that financial liberalization also promotes international portfolio diversification, it may raise savings and investments, though with ambiguous effects on productivity.
Indirectly, financial globalization may foster financial development (see Klein and Olivei, 1999), i.e. the availability of external finance to the private sector, which show to affect positively productivity but not investments. 5 As another indirect channel, however, financial liberalization may trigger financial instability and banking crises, as a wide literature points out (see Aizenmann, 2001 for a survey on the evidence on financial liberalization and crises). Whatever the mechanism generating banking crises, such events may harm the ability of a financial system to provide the economy with credit. As a consequence, both investments in physical capital and innovation can be expected to slow down. In the worst scenario, even TFP might drop, due to the need for shutting down productive projects. I account for the effects of financial instability by controlling all regressions for an indicator of banking crises. In this way, any indirect effect of liberalization through crises is removed from the estimates for the index of financial liberalization. I also estimate the joint effect of crises and liberalization
to assess whether open capital account eases or worsens the recovery from bank crashes.
Before going through these estimations, I explicitely address endogeneity between financial liberalization and banking crises by means of multinomial logit regressions.
I follow three methodologies to assess the effects of financial liberalization and banking crises on investments and productivity, and a fourth to address the link between liberalization and crises. Using two alternative de iure indicators of financial integration, I perform difference in differences estimation of the impact of regime switches, between capital restrictions and openness, and between crises and normal times. To this end, I use a panel data with yearly observations from at most 93 countries over the period 1975-1999. Next, I estimate the same relationships using five-year averages. I then turn to the long-run analysis and estimate equations for TFP and capital growth rates as a function of initial productivity and capital stock respectively, financial globalization and the other controls over a period of 25 year in a sample of 85 countries. To overcome problems of unobserved country-specific effects and endogeneity of regressors, typical of cross-sectional estimates, I adopt the system GMM dynamic panel technique proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) A formal theory that justifies a positive effect of financial liberalization on productivity rather than capital accumulation seems to be missing at this stage. I provide a simple model that explains result (1), based on gains from trade in financial services. The main idea is that financial liberalization allows trade, hence specialization, in financial services such as deposits, loans and screening of investments. I assume there are many sectors in the economy, and that there are good and bad firms in each sectors, but neither investors nor entrepreneurs know a firm's quality ex-ante. Financial intermediaries do have a screening technology that allows them to screen firms and imperfectly learn their quality. Intermediaries and their screening technologies are sector specific, so that also the share of good firms that get financed is sector specific. Therefore, firms in different sectors face different borrowing conditions (interest rates), which vary with the average productivity of each sector, hence with the screening ability of the intermediaries. This implies that under financial autarky, some sectors will be financed more efficiently than others. Let sector-specific screening technologies differ across countries, so that the intermediaries of country H are better than those of country F at screening certain sectors but worse at screening others. When financial markets are open to international transactions, firms of each sector can decide to get financed by the intermediaries with the most efficient screening technology worldwide, regardless of the country of origin. In other words, specialization in financial intermediation occurs. This leads to a (weakly) more efficient allocation of capital in each and every country, hence to higher aggregate productivity. This mechanism does not imply an immediate and unambiguous increase in investment.
Capital accumulation does indeed rise, but with some lag and as an effect of the boost in productivity. This and other additional predictions of the model are supported both by existing empirical evidence and by new results presented in the paper.
The contribution of this paper is mainly related to three strands of literature. The literature on growth and development accounting has shown that a large share of crosscountry differences in economic performance is driven by total factor productivity (TFP) rather than factor accumulation (physical and human capital). 6 Hall and Jones (1999) point out that a substantial share of GDP per worker variation is explained by differences in TFP and provide evidence that productivity is to a large extent determined by institutional factors. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) show that also GDP growth differentials are mainly accounted for by differences in the growth rates of TFP. These results suggest that financial globalization may affects the wealth of nations through its impact on TFP, rather than factor accumulation, and that it may be important to distinsuish between the two channels.
Several authors suggest that financial development spurs GDP growth by fostering productivity growth, not only by raising the funds available for accumulation. Theoretical papers by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2005), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Aghion, Howitt and Mayer (2005b) among others show that financial development may relieve risky innovators from credit constraints, thereby fostering growth through technological change. While earlier contributions (e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990 ) suggest that financial development fosters growth simply by increasing participation in production and risk pooling, in the later works the relationship is also driven by advances in productivity. King and Levine (1993) , and, in more detail, Beck Levine and Loayza (2000) show evidence of a strong effect of financial development on TFP growth, and only a tenuous effect on physical capital accumulation. the Tobin's Q of listed firms, and conclude that these must be driven by changes in productivity, which they do not explore directly though. Another call for studies on financial integration and productivity is in Prasad et al. (2006) . This paper is a first attempt at filling the gap.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview on growth and development accounting, which leads on to the discussion of my empirical strategy. In section 3, I describe the dataset, with particular attention to the indicators of financial liberalization and banking crises, as well as the construction of the data for physical capital and TFP. Section 4 presents the econometric methodologies, and section 5 reports the results from the estimation of the equations for investments and TFP. Section 6 proposes a simple model to explain the evidence in the previous sections and provides firther evidence in favor of the mechanism. Section 7 concludes.
The empirical strategy
The literature on growth and developing accounting takes as starting poing the Cobb Douglas specification for the aggregate production function,
where K is the aggregate capital stock, L the number of workers and H their average 
have shown that also cross-country differentials in GDP growth are to a large extent generated by differentials in productivity growth (Ȧ A ).
All studies on the impact of financial liberalization and banking crises on growth have focused onẎ Y , without assessing whether the effects are transmitted through factor accumulation or changes in productivity, or both. To grasp the relevance of the exercise proposed in this paper, consider the following growth regression:
where Various aspects of financial markets, such as volume, international liberalization and the occurrence of banking crises, may be expected to affect both physical capital accumulation and factor productivity. have shown evidence of a strong effect of financial depth on productivity, and a much weaker on capital accumulation. 7 Klein and Olivei (1999) and Levine (2001) find that financial liberalization fosters financial development. Should financial liberalization and banking crises affect investment and productivity only through the effect on the volume of credits, their impact on TFP and capital accumulation would thus be expected to be strong and weak respectively. However, there may be other, more direct effects as well.
Opening up the economy to capital inflows and outflows increases the degree of competition among international financial markets, which may lead to improvements in the allocative efficiency of the financial system. This implies that, holding financial depth constant, the average productivity of the financed projects might be higher than under autarky. Financial liberalization also allows for international risk-diversification, which may channel more resourses to risky innovation. Both effects may in turn shift resources away from physical capital accumulation towards TFP growth. As pointed out by Obstfeld (1994), financial globalization promotes specialization, just like trade, raising TFP where productivity is already high, and physical investments in countries far from the technology frontier.
Banking crises may hit industrial sectors to different extents. Financial instability may induce the investors to take less risk, thereby shifting resources from innovation, which is typically riskier, to capital accumulation. However, the opposite might happen if a country deliberately invested in innovation to more quickly recover from the crisis.
The data
I perform the analysis on three datasets: a cross-section of 85 countries with data averaged over the period 1975 and 1999, and two unbalanced panels comprising up to 93 countries with annual and five-year observations over the period 1975-1999. As Table A shows, the largest sample includes twenty-two developed and seventy-one developing countries from all continents. The following subsections describe the main variables I include in the regressions.
Control variables
When assessing the effects of financial liberalization and banking crises on capital accumulation and productivity, I also control for a number of variables.
• Initial real per capita GDP (rgdpch from the PWT 6.1) accounts for different stages of economic development. It is often claimed that richer countries are more likely to have open financial markets, hence the effect of financial liberalization might seem spurious if initial GDP is not controlled for. If adding this variable to the regressions does not take away significance from the coefficient for financial liberalization, the suspects of spuriousness are less sound.
• I include government expenditure as a ratio of GDP (kg from the PWT 6.1) in the regressions for capital accumulation. Several theories predict that government expenditure crowds out private investments. If this is the case, I should expect a negative coefficient in the equation for capital accumulation.
• Financial depth, as proxied by the ratio of total credit to the private sector over GDP (privo from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2001) and its growth rate give a measure of the external finance available to firms. Klein and Olivei (1999) and Levine (2001) show that financial liberalization promotes financial development, which may be expected to foster productivity more than capital accumulation, according to Beck • I also control for openness to trade, proxied by import plus export as a ratio of GDP (openk from the PWT 6.1). Trade may affect the efficiency of an economy through several channels, such as specialization according to comparative advantage, access to larger markets with more product variety and increased competition. These effects may in turn stimulate both capital accumulation and productivity growth.
However, the impact of trade may also depend on the distance of a country to the world technology frontier, as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2005).
• Intellectual property right protection is expected to enhance productivity by giving incentives for innovation. This is controlled for by using the measure (ipr) by Ginarte and Park (1997), which is available for five-year periods from 1960 to 1990.
• Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) show that the existence of explicit deposit insurance increases the likelihood of bank runs and thus crises of the banking sector.
Hence, I include a measure of deposit insurance (depins) from Demirguc-Kunt and
Sobaci (2000) in the logit analysis for banking crises.
• I also control for inflation (from the World Development Indicators) in the logit for banking crises. I take this variable as an indicator of bad macroeconomic policies, which are likely to make a country prone to crises.
• Finally, I use indicators of economic and institutional development to check for heterogeneity in the effects of financial liberalization and banking crises on both investments and productivity. In the cross-sectional estimates for TFP growth I explicitely control for institutional quality using the Government Anti-Diversion Policy index (gadp, from Hall and Jones, 1999) as a proxy. As an indicator of economic development, I construct a dummy (developing) that takes value 1 if the country is defined as low or middle-low income in the World Development Indicators, and 0 otherwise. In the panel regressions, I use these indicators to split the sample and construct interactive terms. This dummy variable, EML, differs from CAL because it only accounts for equity market liberalization and not, for instance, credit market liberalization. As opposed to CAL, it does not allow for policy reversals: it labels a country as open ever since its first year of liberalization.
Factors affecting capital accumulation and productivity may also influence the decision of a country to liberalize financial markets. Moreover, there may be countries adopting such reforms either after reaching certain levels of investments and productivity, or with the purpose to attain them. This may raise concerns of omitted variables bias or even endogeneity, when estimating the effect of financial liberalization on capital accumulation and TFP. I tackle the issue by estimating the following logit on the annual panel dataset:
where IF L_r it ∈ {CAL_r, EML_r} is an indicator of the reforms observed in country i at time t, and X it is a set of covariates. CAL_r equals 0 if there are no reforms, 1 if a switch into capital account liberalization occurs, -1 if the switch is out of it. EML_r does not admit reversals, thus it equals 1 in case of equity market liberalization reforms, and 0 otherwise. When the dependent variable is CAL_r, the estimation is performed with a multinomial logit. 9 All standard errors are robust and clustered by country. Following Bekaert et al. (2003) , I include among the covariates a measure of institutional quality (gadp), lagged real GDP (rgdpch), government expenditure (kg), openness to trade (openk), financial depth (privo), inflation and GDP growth. I also control for economic development (developing) and continental dummies.
The results in Table B show the geographical component to capture reforms the most. 10 Perhaps surprisingly, the coefficient for gadp, not significantly different from zero, tells that financial liberalization is not more frequent in countries with good institutions than in the 8 Classification methods have changed in 1996, so that there are now 13 separate indexes that can hardly be compared to the previous single indicator. Miniane (2000) harmonized the classifications, though for a limited number of countries, and over a short time span. 9 All results are robust to the use of logit and probit on separate indicators: CAL_in (1 for switches into capital account liberalization, and 0 otherwise) and CAL_out (1 for switches out of capital account liberalization, and 0 otherwise).
1 0 Note that, if I remove any of the continental dummies, the coefficients for the others remain significant.
others.
Banking crises
Banking Before going through the analysis of the effects of financial liberalization on the sources of growth, I address endogeneity between banking crises and financial liberalization, by estimating the following logit on the annual panel dataset:
The variable BC_type it takes value one if a banking crisis of a given type (systemic, borderline, or either one) has occurred in country i at time t. The vector X it includes a series of covariates, and IF L it is the binary indicator of international financial liberalization. To appreciate the effects of all covariates, I also estimate a multinomial logit for BC it , which takes values 1 and 2 in case of borderline and systemic crises respectively, and zero when no crises occur. 11 I cluster the standard errors by country. Table C reports Table D shows that CAL only has a positive effect on the likelihood of borderline banking crises in developed countries. The positive coefficient in column 3 of Table C is explained by the fact that most banking crises in developed countries are borderline.
Deposit insurance, high real per capita GDP and the growth rate of financial depth mainly affect the probability of systemic crises. High inflation has opposite effects on the likelihood of the two types of crises: negative for borderline and positive for systemic crises. Equity market liberalization has no effect at all. g+δ , where g is the average geometric growth rate of total investments between t 0 and t 0 + 10. 12 In the paper t 0 is 1960, since I have data on investments dating back to that year for most countries. 13 A depreciation rate δ of 6 per cent in ten years is assumed. The later values of the capital stock are easily computed as K t = (1− δ)K t−1 + I t .
Productivity
I construct the series of total factor productivity following the Hall and Jones (1999) approach to the decomposition of output. I assume the production function in country i to be
where Y i is the output produced in country i, K i is the stock of physical capital in use, A i is labor-augenting productivity, L i is the labor in use (rgdpch* pop/ rgdpwok from the PWT 6.1), and H i is a measure of the average human capital of workers (H i L i is therefore human capital-augmented labor). 14 The factor share α is assumed constant across countries and 1 2 Investments are defined as I = ki*rgdpch*pop from the PWT 6.1. 1 3 In the countries which have no data for 1960 t0 is the first year followed by at least 15 observations. Equipped with data on capital, output per worker, population and schooling (from Barro and Lee, 2001), I can compute the series of total factor productivity as
Econometric specifications and methodologies
In the next sections, I follow various methodologies to estimate the effects of financial liberalization and banking crises on the sources of growth. First, I fully exploit the crosssectional and time-series information in the annual dataset and estimate
where P it is a proxy for the outcome variable (eitherK K ,Ȧ A or log(A) in the variuos specifications) observed in country i at year t, X are control variables, IF L is a dummy for financial liberalization and BC an indicator of banking crises. To reduce problems with simultaneity bias, all regressors enter as lagged values. η i is a country-specific fixed effect capturing heterogeneity in the determinants of P that are specific to i. Its inclusion in (4) implies that γ is only estimated from the within-country variation around the liberalization date. The fixed year effects (ν t ) allow me to compare the change in P between the pre and post-reform periods in countries that have liberalized with the change in the countries that maintained the restrictions. This means that equation (4) is a "difference in differences"
(D-i-D) specification, since it implies differencing out the time-mean for each i, and the common trend for all i's at any t.
Two main problems may undermine the ability of γ to identify a causal link from financial liberalization to the sources of growth. First, there may be concerns about the selection of the countries that liberalized. As the results in Table B suggest, geographical location is a good predictor for reforms on international capital transactions. Suppose there are fewer liberalization episodes among countries of a certain area which also experiences particularly low productivity growth. This area-specific productivity trend may bias the effect of financial liberalization upwards. To control for this bias, I check if there are such differences across areas (Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe+North America) and, if so, I include interacted time-area dummies. Table E reports A problem of endogeneity of policy changes may also arise. Suppose a country opens up when experiencing an economic crisis to help the recovery or alternatively when it is already on a sustained growth path. This may attribute a negative or positive effect to financial liberalization which is actually due to a trend, thereby producing biased estimates. As a solution to this problem, I control for a dummy taking value 1 during the three or five years prior to the liberalization and zero otherwise. This allows me to verify whether the change in P was part of a previous trend or caused by liberalization.
To assess the effects of policy changes and banking crises in the medium-run, I also perform difference in differences estimates on a five-year panel dataset. In this case, the dependent variable is observed at the end of the period, while the regressors are expressed as beginning-of-period values.
When investingating the effects of financial openness on TFP and capital in the long run, I estimate the following growth regressions:
where dp i(t−τ,t) = 100 log(P it )−log(P it−τ ) τ with p ∈ {a, k}, P ∈ {A, K}, and the regressors indexed by (t − τ, t) are τ -year period averages. A coefficient estimateλ < 0 indicates that there is conditional convergence in productivity. The speed of convergence b can be obtained from the definition of λ = −100
1−e bτ τ . I first estimate equation (5) on a 25-year cross section (τ = 25). As enphasized by the empirical growth literature, cross-sectional estimates have several limits. They do not allow me to exploit the time-series variation in the data, which is important to assess the effects of reforms, such as financial iberaliza-tion; nor to control for omitted variables, country-specific effects and endogeneity of the regressors. In this case, addressing endogeneity with an instrumental variable strategy looks rather difficult. Legal origins may be a good instrument for financial development I address the first problem by turning to panel data. Note that the specification of equation (5) with u it = η i + ν t + ε it includes the lagged dependent variable. It follows that, even if ε it is not correlated with p it−τ , the estimates are not consistent with a finite time span. Moreover, consistency may be undermined by the endogeneity of other explanatory variables, as in the cross-sectional estimates. To correct for the bias created by lagged endogenous variables, and the simultaneity of some regressors, I follow the approach proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . I estimate the following system with GMM dp it = β 0 + θdp it−5 + β
where dp it equals log(
), and the other regressors are the same as in the previous equations. Levels indexed by (t − 5, t) are five-year averages. η i , ν t and ε it are respectively the unobservable country-and time-specific effects, and the error term, respectively. The presence of country effect in equation (7) corrects the omitted variable bias. The differences in equation (6) and the instrumental variables estimation of the system are aimed at amending inconsistency problems. I instrument differences of the endogenous and predetermined variables with lagged levels in equation (6) and levels with differenced variables in equation (7). For instance, I take a it−15 as an instrument for da it−5 and IF L it−10 for dIF L it in (6) and da it−10 as an instrument for a it−5 and dIF L it−5 for IF L it in (7). I estimate the system by two-step Generalized Method of Moments with moment conditions E[da it−5s
(ε it − ε it−5 )] = 0 for s ≥ 2, and E[dz it−5s (ε it − ε it−5 )] = 0 for s ≥ 2 on the predetermined variables z, for equation (6); E[da i,t−5s (η i + ε i,t )] = 0 and E[dz i,t−5s (η i + ε i,t )] = 0 for s = 1 for equation (7) . I treat all regressors as predetermined. The validity of the instruments is guaranteed under the hypothesis that ε it are not second order serially correlated.
Coefficient estimates are consistent and efficient if both the moment conditions and the no-serial correlation are satisfied. To validate the estimated model, I apply a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, and a test of second-order serial correlation of the residuals.
As pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991) , the estimates from the first step are more efficient, while the test statistics from the second step are more robust. Therefore, I will report coefficients and statistics from the first and second step respectively. Note that in this case the speed of convergence (divergence) is given by θ = e 5b .
5 The results
Financial integration, banking crises and capital accumulation: D-i-D
I estimate the following equation for investments
where dk it = 100
proxies physical capital accumulation observed in country i at time t. 15 I take different frequencies, with τ equal to one and five years respectively, to assess the impact on the short and medium run. When I use the five-year panel, the dependent variable is observed at the end of the period and the regressors at the beginning. Since IF L is a binary indicator variable both in the annual and five-year panel, the coefficients will be difference in difference estimates. Note however that its significance is fully restored when any of the additional controls is removed from the regression (result not reported). The coefficients in column 4 show that richer countries accumulate more capital, while government expenditure tends to crowd out 1 5 The evidence is robust to the use of investments as a ratio of GDP as a proxy of the dependent variable. The results are availablie upon request. 1 6 The results do not change if I use CAL_switch5, which equals 1 for the five years prior to the reform.
investments. The growth rate of physical capital is lower where financial intermediation (as proxied by privo) is higher and has grown less (the latter is not reported, but available upon request). This suggests that countries invest more in physical capital when their financial systems are at early stages of development and growing rapidly. Columns 5 and 6 report the estimates for the subsamples of developed and developing countries, as defined by the World Bank. 17 Interestingly, capital account liberalization has a positive effect on investments in the developed countries, and no impact in the others. As in column 4, removing any of the additional controls restores the negative coefficient for BC, without affecting the positive estimate for CAL in the developed countries. Finally, the results are robust to the inclusion of openness to trade, whose coefficient always turns out to be insignificant and is thus omitted.
In Table 1b I replicate the estimations of Table 1a replacing the capital account indicator with the indicator of equity market liberalization. All columns suggest that EML has a positive effect on capital accumulation, while the other regressors behave as in Table   1a . 18 The difference in difference estimates from the five-year panel, reported in Tables   2a-2b , do not show any significant differences from the results obtained on the annual dataset. Capital account liberalization has almost no effect on investments, while equity 
in the panel datasets with annual and five-year data. When I use the five-year panel, the dependent variable is observed at the end of the period and the regressors at the beginning.
As already mentioned in sections 4 and 5, this is a difference in difference specification. Tables 3a and 3b report results from the yearly panel. The coefficients for CAL and 1 7 Heterogeneity in the effects of financial liberalization could also be addressed by including an interacted dummy F LIB * developing in the full-sample regression. This method, however, may deliver biased estimates if there is heterogeneity in other coefficients, as shown in Tables 1a-1b. 1 8 The estimation sample of Table 1b is a subset of the sample in Table1a. However, the coefficients for CAL are not sensitive to the sample. Results from re-estimating Table 1a on the sample of Table 1b are available upon request.
EML are positive and significant across all specifications in columns 1-4. While equity market liberalization has a stronger effect in developing countries, the removal of capital account restrictions is beneficial in all countries, as shown by columns 5-6 of both tables.
Banking crises have a negative and significant effect on TFP under all specifications.
Note that when I add intellectual property rights protection among the regressors, twenty countries drop out of the sample due to missing observations. Nevertheless, the estimates for CAL, EML and BC in the equations of columns 1-3 do not change if I restrict the sample. Interestingly, the coefficients for privo in columns 4-6 suggest that financial development on average tends to have a positive effect on productivity. However, its effect is positive in the developing countries and negative in the developed ones. This result may support the hypothesis that financial development favors convergence in productivity.
Notice that the coefficients for financial liberalization and banking crises remain significant, even after controlling for financial development. This suggest that both have a direct effect on productivity. The coefficient estimates for ipr confirm the expectations of a positive effect on TFP, mainly in the developed countries where R&D capacity is probably higher.
In Tables 4a and 4b I report the results from the difference in difference estimates on the five-year panel. Here, the dependent variable is observed at the end of the five-year period, the dummy for financial liberalizaiton takes value 1 if a country has experienced no restrictions for at least one year and BC equals one if there has been at least one year of banking crisis. The positive coefficients for CAL is significant in the basic specification of column 1 but becomes not significant when I include pre-reform trends, continent-time effects and the full set of control variables. BC has a negative effect on TFP under every specification. The positive coefficient for equity market liberalization is more robust than that for CAL, and survives in most columns of Table 4b . Among the other control variables, the most significant is financial depth, which affects productivity positively in the developing countries, as in Tables 3a and 3b.
TFP growth and capital accumulation in the long run
To evaluate the effects on productivity growth and capital accumulation in the long run, I perform cross-sectional estimations of the following equations:
The regressors indexed by (t − 25, t) are expressed in twenty-five-year averages. It follows that the estimates for γ and δ capture the effects of the occurrence and length of financial liberalization and banking crises on the variable of interest. Period averages cannot, though, discriminate between liberalizations and crises happening early and late in the sample, nor between inerrupted and uninterrupted episodes delivering the same mean. Tables 5a and 5b show that countries that start with a lower stock of capital experience a higher rate of capital accumulation, other thing equal, since the coefficients for k_25 are always negative and significant. While capital account liberalization does not affect capital accumulation, equity market liberalization has a positive effect on it under some specifications. Banking crises tend to have a negative impact on the growth rate of capital.
The results in Tables 6a and 6b support robustly the hypothesis of conditional convergence in productivity, with an implied speed of convergence b between 1 and 2 per cent per year. 19 The effect of banking crises on TFP growth is negative and significant under all specifications. In Table 5a , capital account liberalization has a positive and significant coefficient only under the basic specification (column1), and has no different effect across countries that experienced banking crises or and those that did not (column 2). The coefficient for a t−25 * CAL, aimed at assessing whether financial liberalization affects the pace of convergence, is nil in column 3. EML in Table 6b holds a positive and significant coefficient throughout columns 1-3. Like CAL, it does not interact with banking crises nor with the initial level of productivity. It loses its significance once I control for GADP in columns 4 and 5. Both Table 6a and 6b suggest that the institutional factors captured by GADP, together with initial productivity, are the most important determinant of TFP growth. None of the other control variables seem to affect productivity growth.
The dynamics of productivity and capital
The dynamic panel estimates in Tables 7a and 7b confirm the prediction of the neoclassical growth model, that capital accumulation slow down as capital grows up towards its steady state value, and also that there is conditional convergence across countries. The coefficients for Capital account and equity market liberalization in Table 7a confirm the result from the cross-sectional analysis. The estimates in Table 7b however, suggest that the positive effect of equity market liberalization on capital accumulation is not robust. What holds robust is that banking crises depressed investments, though to a lesser extent in countries with high initial capital stocks.
The dynamic panel data estimates in Tables 8a and 8b confirm the cross sectional 1 9 Remember that the speed of convergence is computed from λ = −100
evidence in favor of conditional convergence in productivity. The implied speed of convergence is now higher and lies between 1.2 and 4.4 per cent per year. Capital account liberalization spur productivity growth in a robust way, while the negative effect of banking crises is now weaker and the impact of equity market liberalization becomes negligible.
Trade does not seem to have a significant effect on TFP growth. Table 8b 
A simple model of financial globalization, TFP and investments
The economy is populated by two overlapping generations of agents, who work, save and consume a final good, which is produced by competitive firms using a continuum of intermediate goods. Firms producing these goods employ labor and capital, which they borrow from hoseholds through financial intermediaries.
Households
There are two overlapping generations of agents. At the beginning of each period a mass L of new agents are born and a mass L die (no population growth). Agents born at time t supply one unit of labor inelastically, earn wage w t and allocate it between consumption c Y t and savings s t . When old, at time t + 1, they don't work but invest their savings through financial intermediaries who pay interest rate R t+1 , and eventually consume all the proceeds: c O t+1 = R t+1 s t . Utility is increasing and concave in consumtion and time-separable. An agent born at time t has to choose c Y t and c O t+1 that solve:
The first order conditions deliver the Euler equation
Savings will therefore be a function of current wage and future interest rate: s t = s (w t , R t+1 ) with s 0 w > 0 and s 0 R Q 0 depending on the u functional form. Production A final good Y is used for consumption and investment, and is produced by competitive firms employing a series of intermediate goods y j , j ∈ [0, 1], with an asymmetric CobbDouglas technology,
It follows that demand for intermediate good j is described by
, where p tj and P t are the prices of the intermediate and final good respectively. Take the final good as the numeraire and set P = 1 for convenience. Hence,
Intermediate good j is produced by a continuum of competitive firms i ∈ [0, F j ], with F j >1 for all j 's, using capital and labor. In each sector there are good firms (with mass one) and bad firms, producing
Firms don't have capital to run production, hence they need to borrow it through financial intermediaries.
Financial intermediation
Ex-ante, the quality of projects is unknown to all agents in the economy. However, financial intermediaries can screen loan applicants in order to learn their quality before financing them. The screening technology is sector-specific and imperfect, so that intermediaries get to allocate to good firms only a share 0 < a j < 1 of the total amount they lend to sector j. Intermediaries face perfect competition on both deposit and credit markets, hence they must repay to depositors (the Old) the same return R t . In order to break even, they require good firms to repay a j R j = R, since bad firms give zero returns.
Assume that the quality of a firm is revealed after irreversibly employing capital but before hiring labor, so that all young agents are employed in good firms and earn the same non-zero wage w t . Firm i in sector j employs capital and labor in order to maximize profits, given factor prices:
The first order conditions deliver the following demands for factors:
Notice that aggregate production of intermediate good j is y tj = a j y tij . Substituting y tij and p tj , sector j factor demands become
Substituting 11 and 12 in 10, the production of intermediate good j is
Equilibrium in the closed economy
In the closed economy, the following conditions must be satisfied, in addition to 8-12:
After substituting K tj and L j from 11 and 12 into 13 and 14 respectively, factor prices
Replacing them into the expression for intermediate goods production and aggregating by sectors delivers GDP as
Define aggregate productivity in financial autarky Z A = Ae 1 0
σ j log(a j )dj . It follows that factor prices are
The dynamics
Assume log utility. It follows that savings are a constant fraction of wage income, s t = β 1+β w t and capital is accumulated following the law
The steady state is associated to capital
Old agents can invest their savings through domestic and foreign intermediaries and firms can borrow from either domestic or foreign intermediaries. Assume the final good can be traded. Assume that sector-specific screening abilities differ across countries:
for at least one j. Supose a H k > a F k , then foreign firms of sector k prefer to get financed by the home intermediaries. It follows that in all sectors a c j = max
Notice that a H k > a F k generates absolute, not just comparative advantage for home intermediaries in sector k, since ....
Conditions 13 and 14 become
Note that
)dj is aggregate productivity of country c under financial integration. It fol-lows that
1−α . After some algebra, obtain:
Gains from Financial Integration
Assume both countries are at their autarky steady state when international capital flows are set free, at time t. Denote by c and cA the variables in country c under financial integration and autarky respectively.
Capital stocks are given,
in the sectors that raise capital abroad, hence aggregate productivity increases in both countries:
Output increases as an effect of increased productivity:
It follows that also wages increase, hence more capital gets accumulated and investments increase in the next generation:
More evidence on the mechanism
The model predicts that capital accumulation eventually follows total factor productivity, hence investments should respond positively to financial globalization, though with a period lag. Table 9 reports results from estimating the system (6)- (7) for capital, adding a lagged term of capital account liberalization and the average level of TFP. 20 As it is evident from column 2, financial integration spurs capital accumulation with one period lag. Furthermore, column 3 suggests that this effect is conveyed by the growth in TFP, since the coefficient for CAL t−5 is no longer significant once I account for TFP, whose coefficient is positive and significant. The model does not deliver predictions on output volatility. In the models that see financial globalization mainly as an international portfolio diversificaiton device (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994), financial integration tends to foster risk taking at a single country level, which rises output volatility. Table 10 reports results from OLS regressions of the 1980-1999 sample standard deviation of log-GDP on the growth rate of GDP and the indicators of IFL and banking crises. The negative and significant coefficients of IFL are not consistent with the prediction of financial globalization raising output volatility. The same holds for TFP in columns 5-8.
Conclusions
A wide literature has focused on the effect of financial liberalization on GDP growth, often finding mixed results. To better understand the effect of financial liberalization, however, it is important to know the channels through which it operates. This paper has attempted to probe deeper into the relationship by separately studying the impact of financial openness on two sources of income growth: capital accumulation and productivity. Contrary to the existing literature, I find fairly robust results. In particular, financial liberalization has little effect on capital accumulation, while it has a positive effect on productivity.
The paper also proposes an explanation for the empirical results of a positive effect of financial integration on productivity and a weaker link to capital accumulation. The main idea is that removing restrictions to international financial transaction opens to trade in financial services, like the screening of loan applicants. As in ricardian models, trade leads to specialization, which raises allocative efficiency within each and every country, thereby fostering TFP growth. Capital accumulation reacts to financial integration with some lag since it follows the increase in productivity, as also confirmed by the empirical evidence.
The paper has also studied the impact of financial instability on economic performance and the relationship between financial openness and crisis. As expected, crises are found to be detrimental, both for productivity and capital accumulation. However, there is no evidence that financial openness increases the likelihood of crisis, except for borderline crisis in developing countries. Thus, the concern that the removal of barriers to capital mobility may expose an economy to higher financial risk seems unwarranted. 
